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Abstract
Meyers, Courtney. M.A. The University of Memphis. 5/2011. Getting the Joke: Humor
Effects on Information Sharing of Political News
This paper examines the role of humor in information sharing of political issues using
social media. In an experiment with 164 participants from the University of Memphis, the effects
of sharing and information seeking were tested using Stephan Colbert’s comedy, and the same
story told as straight news. This research found people are more likely to pass along information
using social media if the issue is told in a humorous way. Conversely, Colbert’s persona seems to
effect information seeking rather than primarily interest.
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Introduction
Comedy and tragedy have undergirded human communication since Euripides penned the
Oresteia and Aristophanes, The Clouds. These two themes often frame political discussion and
contribute to information dissemination among the electorate. Perhaps not surprising, tragedy
appears to garner greater legitimacy. Just as the Oscars routinely award dramas and overlook
comedies, many studies of political communication have focused on dramatization and tragedy
(Bennett, 2008; Holbert, 2005). Political humorists themselves often emphasize the illegitimacy
of their craft as can be seen by Jon Stewart’s recent upbraid of the media in his “Rally to Restore
Sanity and/or Fear,” and his insistence on a demarcation between himself and political
journalists. Yet, many people, especially those under 35, report getting their news from professed
“fake-news” sources such as The Daily Show and The Colbert Report, and Jon Stewart routinely
gets higher rankings than his hard news counter-parts (Pew, 2010). Why then is comedic framing
of political events deemed less legitimate and therefore exempt from scrutiny? This paper argues
comedic framing of politics deserves attention specifically for its contribution to information
sharing using social media Web sites.
As consumption of traditional news sources wanes, i.e. print journalism, more people are
turning to Internet sources as a means of staying informed (Nie, Miler, Golde, Butler, & Winneg,
2010). Similarly with the upswing in social media, the radius of the water-cooler effect expands.
Information has the potential to be passed along beyond one’s immediate vicinity. This paper
argues humor is particularly well suited for information sharing. No one likes to be the bearer of
bad news. Humor softens the blow, making it more likely when someone is given the option
between two stories on the same topic, one humorous, one serious, he or she will share the
humorous story. To test this theory, university students were assigned to one of three conditions.
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Each condition presented the same story, with the exact same information, framed either with
humor or gravity. The results showed a significant relationship between sharing and humor.
Furthermore the Colbert personality rather than mere interest acts as a catalyst for influencing a
desire to seek more information. Therefore, while sharing is driven by humor, information
seeking is driven by Colbert.
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Chapter I: Literature
Social Media
The tools and strategies for communicating have changed notably with the emergence of
social media. This type of media “describes a variety of new sources of online information that
are created, initiated, circulated, and used by consumers intent on educating each other about
products, brands, services, personalities, and issues” (Blackshaw, & Nazzaro, 2004, p.2). Forums
for social media are multifarious including blogs, rating Web sites, sponsored discussion boards
and chat rooms, e-mail, moblogs (sites containing digital audio, video, images, photographs, and
other multimedia applications), social networking sites, etc. (Mangold, & Faulds, 2008). Social
network sites, which are a subset of social media, have been defined as "web-based services that
allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2)
articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their
list of connections and those made by others within the system" (Boyd , & Ellison, 2007). The
trend in social media is not restricted to business or personal communication activities. In fact,
politicians were among the first to embrace this new form of communication.
The proportion of voters using new media to gather information has grown from 1988 to
present. Research indicates that as of 2008, 55% of the electorate had used the Internet to learn
about the campaign (Smith, 2009). In his book New Media Campaigns and the Managed Citizen,
Philip Howard calls the online interaction between presidential candidates, their respective
camps, and the constituents, hypermedia, and says that the feedback loops for these interactive
information technologies are different enough to warrant “specific and critical” treatment.
Specifically, he tackles whether, new media campaigns mirror e-commerce tactics of “directmarketing,” “mass customization,” and “broadcast individualism,” asking what if any
6

implications this has on the functioning of democracy (Howard, 2005, p. 32). He limits his
inquiry to campaigns, focusing on the relationship between the politician and the public.
However, outside the campaign, politics and political issues continue. Journalists, intent on
informing the public broadcast these issues. Sometimes the public, using social media, recirculates them. For the issue to be passed along, it must resonate somehow with the receiver.
Humor is particularly well suited for being passed along, as people want to share jokes and
enliven members of their social circle. When political information is couched in humor, the
likelihood people will share it increases. For this reason, political humorists such as Stephen
Colbert and Jon Stewart have leverage in influencing the lifespan of a news story. Nevertheless,
humor remains an under-studied frame. Furthermore few researchers have empirically tested
what people actually choose to post on social media Web sites. The increased role of the Internet
among consumers of political comedy has not received adequate attention (Nie et al., 2010;
Xenos, & Becker, 2009). Nor has this relationship been explored for its potential to foster
political knowledge and its contribution to the processes of political news sharing (Xenos, &
Becker, 2009). This is a major area for new research.
Not only does the Internet constitute a new source of information, it also changes the
communicative model (Nie et al., 2010). The model is no longer a simple feedback loop where a
source transmits information through channels to publics and then the publics respond back
through channels to the source. Social media acts as an additional filtering mechanism in an
oversaturated media market. By allowing the public to share information of interest with others
in their networks, messages that receive the most attention are those the public finds most
interesting. Interest itself is not random. Comedy and tragedy are the two most pervasive themes
in human communication, and humor has a greater participatory quality than tragedy (Delli
7

Carpini, & Williams, 1996). Thus, humor has a greater potential to be passed along, or shared
among members of the public.
Rhetoric and Humor
Many researchers of democracy have focused on the role of deliberation (Habermas,
1984; Rawls, 1971; Young, 2000). Inevitably, questions arise about how the deliberation process
should function. This includes not only the style of rhetoric, but also the transmission of
information through media. For example, do certain styles privilege certain groups? Is one style
more suited to producing an informed, participatory public? These questions are important
because they can affect what enters the public sphere, and therefore who has a stake in the
decision-making process.
For example, Iris Young (2000) challenges Jurgen Habermas’ assertion that in a
deliberative space speech acts should parse out the perlocative effects on the listener. In other
words, the speech ideally suited for the public sphere should exclude elements aimed at forcing a
particular outcome. Young argued this is impossible. Furthermore, she argued rhetoric more than
relays information. It also embodies elements aimed at increasing the likelihood publics will
absorb information. For example, Young identifies at least four overlapping elements of rhetoric:
(1) emotional tone, which contains elements of fear, joy, and anger; (2) figures of speech such as
puns, metaphors, humor, etc.; (3) signs, symbols, and other visual media, and (4) attention to an
audience’s personal history and background. It has been suggested political humor works to
facilitate understanding by those outside the public sphere, thereby creating an avenue by which
they can insert themselves into political discussions (Smith , & Voth, 2002). This paper
examines what, if any, effect Young’s rhetorical elements have on political deliberation with
special attention to the role of humor.
8

Frames are constructs individuals use to organize and interpret their world, and facilitate
learning (Carlson, 1986). Of all the major poetic frames including epic, tragedy, comedy, elegy,
satire, burlesque, and grotesque, only comedy and tragedy have existed throughout history
(Burke, 1959; Kerr, 1967). Plato, for example, attributed the conviction of Socrates in part to the
comedy of Aristophanes. This suggests comedy is not only extant in politics, but also comedy
can influence politics. In the United States, humor is as American as apple pie. From Benjamin
Franklin’s quip that the signers of the Declaration of Independence shall “hang to together or
else hang apart” to Jon Stewart’s characterization of US military action in the Middle East as
Mess O' Potamia “the United States political arena has served as an important target and
scapegoat for comedians, editorialists and naysayers” (Smith , & Voth, 2002, p. 110). Why then
have scholars only recently begun to examine the role of humor in politics?
Smith and Voth (2002) claim that humor in democracy has matured to a level of
significance equal to politics itself. While they may exaggerate, they highlight humor’s relevance
in politics, suggesting humor is an important topic of study. Nevertheless, political scientists only
of late have begun studying humor effects, and results have varied and focused primarily on
learning rather than teasing out participation effects or linking it to the growing trend in online
news consumption. One possible reason humor only recently has become a subject of study lies
in its makeup. What does it mean to take a serious look at humor? How does one approach with
gravity to a topic that thrives on levity? Another possible explanation for humor’s exclusion is its
association with an audience “outside the public sphere” (Smith, & Voth, 2002). The Greeks
viewed comedy as entertainment for the masses, primarily the lower-echelons of society. A
similar reputation permeates today. However, some research on humor has shown it is the
incongruence of gravitas and levity, which creates humor and etches it in memory. Furthermore,
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the fact United States citizens possess low levels of political knowledge, despite the increase in
available information, implies for information to be obtained it has to both differentiate and
resonate with the learner. In other words, the information has to stick out to the receiver, or
otherwise run the risk of being passed over. Chong and Druckman’s (2010) recent research
suggests timing plays a big role in shaping peoples perception of issues. People weight higher the
more recent story. They contribute a great deal of understanding to how people weigh differing
views. However, they do not look at differences in how the issue is packaged. This paper hopes
to expand on their research by looking at the framing effects of political communication,
specifically humor. Stewart and Colbert’s rising popularity over the past decade suggests
humor’s relevance in politics is on the rise if not at its apex. Humor is not an innocuous
rhetorical device.
The Humor Frame
While humor and tragedy are the mainstays of rhetorical framing, it has been suggested
that tragedy is Western society’s default frame (Christenson , & Hansen, 1996). Smith and Voth
(2002) contend that tragic action allows authority to single out those in error, acting as a force of
condemnation rather than as a force of correction. Those at the top of the social hierarchy prefer
the tragic frame because it maintains the status quo and legitimates authoritative power. Using
the tragic frame, authority can maintain the victim status and articulate the need to right societal
wrongs and preserve order (Smith, & Voth, 2002). Conversely, comic framing, they argue, is a
frame of acceptance, where relationships are amicable, and actors are able to engage in a mutual
dialogue (Burke, 1959; Duncan, 1968; Smith , & Voth, 2002). Burke (1959) claims humor
allows actors to recognize their shortcomings as well as offers a tool for discerning the irrational
from the rational. Duncan (1968) went so far as to say “Comedy teaches us that only so long as
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reason can function openly in society can men confront and correct their evil as men, not
cowering slaves” (p. 60). According to Moore (1992) humorists infer society is flawed and open
to criticism.
Comedic topics are not necessarily ones that lack seriousness. Like tragedy comedy
handles grave issues, but comedy interprets the content differently. While the goal of many
politicians’ speech acts are to advance their policy objectives (Edwards, 2000; Neustadt, 1990)
and reinforce the legitimacy of their leadership (Smith, & Voth, 2002), comic frames act as a
check on authority to confront inconsistencies and make corrections to social inequalities.
Nevertheless, this idealized view of comedy is tempered with the reality that sometimes it is
easier to laugh at a leader than to rationalize his or her decisions (Paletz, 1990). President George
W. Bush, for example, was fodder for many comedic sketches, especially among those unhappy
with his policies. Some might suggest the humor directed at Bush increased cynicism. However,
it seems equally possible humor provided an outlet for cynicism among those who felt unable to
participate in the political debate. Instead of trying to rationalize policies, they chose to laugh at
his inconstancies and fumbles. Regardless of whether humor has a positive or negative effect,
humor’s strong presence in political communication supports its efficacy as a topic of scholarly
inquiry (Alisky, 1990; Bostdorff, 1991; Pfua, Cho, & Chong, 2001).
Some scholars of humor contend comedy acts as a facilitator for the electorate’s learning
about the democratic process (Burke, 1959; Smith & Voth ,2000; Zillmann, et al.; 1980). Not
only can comedy tackle serious issues, but it also makes able the confrontation of problems not
suited for tragic framing, permitting a new form of understanding (Smith, & Voth, 2000).
Additionally, they argue humor creates a type of transcendence that allows subjects to become
“observers of themselves” (Burke, 1959, p.171). Smith and Voth (2000) contend that the purpose
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of political humor is not to replace the existing social structure, but rather to reveal its
imperfections and attempt to make small corrections. They also point out comedy is not always
accepting. Using the example of Dan Quayle in the 1992 election, Smith and Voth (2000)
demonstrate that comedy can take down a politician by discrediting him as a viable leader.
Similar studies of presidential elections, Supreme Court nomination processes, etc. support the
power of humor to influence individuals’ perceptions of leaders (Baumgartner & Mirris, 2006;
Brewer & Cao, 2006; Hollander, 2005; Xenos, & Becker, 2009). This suggests the comedic
frame can act as a means of disseminating information, and the images humor inspires about
political actors can influence the perceptions of voters.
These processes have aroused scholarly interest in studying the mechanisms through
which emotion influences memory (Christianson, 1992; Kaplan & Pascoe, 1977; Kintsch &
Bate, 1977; Schmidt, 1994; Zillmann et al.; 1990). Schmidt (1994) examined the effects of
humor on sentence memory; Kaplan and Pascoe compared learning effects between lectures with
either serious or humorous delivery, and Kintsch and Bate (1977) compared memory during
lectures for recollection of statements, details, and extraneous remarks and jokes (Schmidt,
1994). Results have been mixed. Kaplan and Pascoe (1977) reported negative effects, while
Zillmann (1980) found positive results. One possibility for the differences in findings is the
difficulty in creating a controlled experiment. Since humorous material is often packaged with
topics of interest to the subject, matching content and isolating humor compounds attempts to
gauge the strength of its effects (Schmidt, 1994). This paper attempts to improve on past studies
by matching content as closely as possible between conditions.
In an effort to better examine humor effects, some studies have tried to link biological
and psychological responses to humorous stimuli. While a majority of studies noted a greater
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arousal response associated with negative frames, McGee (1983) reported participants’
respiration and heart rate increased in reaction to a humorous event, and these reactions indicated
the sympathetic nervous system was activated in response to humor stimuli. Nevertheless, some
have argued arousal of the sympathetic nervous system is asymmetrical, and tipped in favor of
negative evoking frames (Isen, 1985). This experiment found no significant difference between
the mean learning score in the humor (59%) or the serious (58%) condition. However, it did find
a significant relationship in the Colbert condition when the respondent was asked if he or she
would seek more information on the topic.
People learn from humor because it produces an orienting response (Deckers, & Hricik,
1984). An orienting response is used as a mark of increased attention (Isen, 1985). In other
words, humor increases attention by arising out incongruence, which needs to be reoriented
(Deckers, & Devine, 1981; Suls, 1992). Something is funny because it is unexpected or does not
seem to belong. The partaker then problem solves to make it fit with what he or she expected.
For example, President Ford slipping and falling as he descends the stairs from Air Force One
became the topic of many jokes, because a clumsy president does not comport with the imagery
of the presidency. Even when humor is expected, such as during comedy sketch shows like
Saturday Night Live, The Daily Show, or The Colbert Report, or during adult cartoons such as
Futurama, Family Guy, or South Park, much of their humor is created out of serious topics like
politics and religion. This mismatch should result in a boost in interest in the event. Indeed, at the
time of President Ford’s misstep, the replaying of this image on both news outlets and comedic
shows like Saturday Night Live created the 1970s equivalent of a viral video. It is this type of
process this paper explores. Will a political story when presented humorously cause viewers to
share it? Given the notoriously low-levels of political information possessed by the American
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public, such questions are important because knowing what people share can influence how
many people will be exposed to information. Furthermore, something spikes interest, will that
activate information seeking behavior, shaping learning?
An Inattentive Public
Attentive publics, or those who pay attention to public policy, have a greater potential to
wield meaningful influence over policymakers and policy outcomes (Baum, 2003; Cohen, 1973;
Greabner, 1983). The American public knows and cares little about politics, both domestic and
abroad (Baum, 2003; Converse, 1990; Delli Carpini, & Ketter, 1996) As their engagement with
politics decreases, their cynicism increases (Niemi et. al.; 1989). At the same time, concern for
foreign affairs diminishes (Baum, 2000, 2003). The result is the preponderance of inattentive
publics. The American people are less likely to pay attention to political information unless the
time and effort required is low or the topic is packaged in an interesting way.
Some might argue, that instead of subsisting for news, political comedy enhances news,
by which viewers then will seek additional information from other sources (Xenos, & Becker,
2009). Viewers of The Daily Show and The Colbert Report receive political information unique
from typical news (Holbert, 2005). Baum (2003) tests the incidental by-product theory using
foreign crises as reported on soft-news programming. He assumes the audience will not
otherwise seek out the information, and offers soft news as a solution to the inattentive public
problem. However, he does not address whether the viewer is seeking political humor, nor does
he test whether viewers will supplement the information from soft news by seeking out other
sources. Furthermore, no one has yet to test whether humor influences the likelihood viewers
will share this information with others.
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Effects of Soft News
Much research has indicated that public scrutiny can influence the actions of Congress
and the president (Baum, 2000). However, the public is by and large uniformed about politics
and uninterested in learning. Those who are interested in politics consume news from different
sources than those who are not engaged (Baum, 2003). The less engaged public turns to soft
news such as talk shows, morning shows, and other infotainment type programs. Soft news
presents issues in easily accessible terms or “cheap frames,” often emphasizing the dramatic and
the sensational (Baum, 2003). Many of soft news’ prevalent themes include “us vs. them”,
“powerlessness”, “injustice”, “human impact” and “morality” (Nueman, Just, & Crigler, 1992;
Powlick, & Katz, 1998).
The rise of soft news stems from the highly competitive environment in the media,
particularly in television (Baum , & Kernell, 1999; Patterson, 2000). To raise profit margins for
news programming requires an increase in the audience. Soft news, or entertainment-oriented
programming, offers such an avenue for raising profits and viewership by capitalizing on both
the inexpensive production costs and the ability to frame issues according to viewer interest.
Production companies have found this format successful as large numbers of Americans
consume soft news (Baum, 2003). However, the past trend in political communication
scholarship has been to treat entertainment and public affairs and immiscible (Bennett, 1998).
Recently scholars have begun to abandon the strict divide between traditional and
entertainment-based political communication (Holbert, 2005; Young, 2004). Mutz (2001)
contends that such distinctions are no longer useful for studying political outcomes. Baum (2003)
found soft news could increase the attention levels of inattentive publics when the program airs
the type of “high-profile political issues” such as “those involving scandal, violence, heroism, or
15

other forms of human drama” (p.91). Nevertheless, Baum (2003) points out public opinion
scholars have failed to study how soft news, or entertainment-oriented media influence viewers’
attitudes of politics, nor what they do with the information once they have obtained it.
In keeping with the research on emotion, Gamson (1999) suggests audiences connect
with humor on an emotional level. Entertainers engage the audience by basing their content on
observations and make generalizations about society. Furthermore they speak to the audience,
treating them as present in the program (Gamson, 1999; Holbert, 2005). Delli Carpini and
Williams (1996) offer further support emphasizing that “viewers interact with television in ways
that are more similar to conversing than to other commonly used metaphors” (pp. 150-151). The
Daily Show and The Colbert Report structure their programs as to present themselves as one of
the public, taking a bottom up approach to message delivery, rather than the top-down approach
common in traditional reporting. Those interested in studying political communications have
begun to recognize the qualitative differences in formatting warrant examination of knowledge
and attitudinal-based outcomes from soft-news viewership (Holbert, 2005).
When entertainment-based programming selects to cover political issues, they are often
high profile issues (Baum, 2003). Foreign crises for example are suited to crossover from hardnews to soft-news, but other highly salient topics are equally suited when they possess
characteristics well-matched for entertainment framing. These select issues have the potential to
reduce the disparity in attentiveness among segments of the public (Baum, 2003). Thus
entertainment-based including humorous-oriented media disseminate information about serious
politics. Consumers of soft news are often college students, young adults, and those with lower
education. In other words, those groups least likely to follow political issues.

16

Foreign issues are particularly apt for studying the information-sharing effects of humor
in soft news programming. Not only, is the American public especially detached from
international issues, but also foreign events are more likely to transcend party lines (Baum,
2003). Therefore, the cynicism associated with partisan politics is less likely to affect the viewer.
However, the relevance of soft news depends on its willingness to cover political topics,
including international stories. While some programs may insert politics sporadically, others
make politics the focal point of their programming agenda.
Daytime shows like Oprah and The View have a wider range of topics. While some
episodes may cover political issues and feature political actors, others may focus human-interest
topics such as teen pregnancy, single parenting, and domestic abuse. Late-night television, David
Letterman, Late Late Show with Craig Ferguson, Jay Leno, etc., also covers politics as a sidebar,
with celebrity guests and entertainment current events as the primary segment. Entertainment
news shows — E-News Daily, Hollywood Tonight — are least likely to cover politics unless
featuring the political activism of celebrities. In contrast, The Daily Show, The Colbert Report,
and Real Time with Bill Maher, use political issues as the catalyst for their programming.
Therefore, coverage of international news is regular though multifarious (Baum, 2003).
While Baum (2003) connects learning to soft news, he supposes under most conditions
the uninterested public will not seek out political information. Rather, he supposes information is
obtained as free-bonus, resulting political information being packaged with entertainmentoriented media. He neglects, however, to examine how programs such as Daily Show and The
Colbert Report, which are political, capture interest and influence information sharing. Do
viewers of such programs also receive information as an incidental by-product, or are they
actively seeking out political information and choosing such programs because they are
17

entertaining? Furthermore, are they more likely to share such information with people in their
networks?
One undeveloped area of analysis is the affects of political satire (Holbert, 2005; Young,
2003, 2004). Baum (2005) argues the use of satire in coverage of political issues is a significant
evolutionary development in political journalism. Contrary to traditional news formats political
satire does not strive to provide statements of fact. Rather, it requires active participation from
the audience. The host offers the audience political information framed humorously. They leave
the audience in charge of interpreting the meaning of humor and therefore the political issue
(Young, 2003, 2004). “Thus political messages provided through these outlets are predominately
implied by the very nature of their being grounded in humor” (Holbert, 2005, p.444). The
process of getting the joke requires action and participation from the receiver.
Humor Effects
One such study looked at whether watching The Daily Show, influenced viewers’
perceptions of George W. Bush and John Kerry during the 2004 presidential election. Although
viewers reported an increased understanding of politics after watching The Daily Show,
Baumgartner and Mirris (2006) reported viewers were more likely to rate the candidates
negatively even when controlling for partisanship and other demographic variables. They
concluded that while entertainment-based programming can contribute to political learning, it
also reinforces cynicism among an already disengaged demographic. This is sad news
considering the Pew Internet and American Life Project 2005 reported 48% of adults used
entertainment media such as The Daily Show as a source of campaign news (Kim, & Vishak
2008).
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In a more recent study, Cao (2010) got similar results when examining the impact The
Daily Show has on public attentiveness. While she found positive increases in viewers’
awareness and knowledge of presidential campaigns and political issues such as the War in
Afghanistan. By the same token, as politically inattentive viewers increased their attentiveness
through watching The Daily Show, their attitudes towards politics became more negative (Cao,
2010). This evidence suggests The Daily Show diminishes viewers’ support for leaders and
political institutions (Baumgartner, & Mirris, 2006). It seems those scholars, who have criticized
political comedy for belittling important political topics and presenting only a superficial level of
information are support at least in part by these studies (Niven, Lichter, & Amundson, 2003).
Conversely, when candidates appeared on entertainment-oriented programs, Baum (2005)
found viewers warmed to the candidate. For example Bill Clinton’s appearance on Saturday
Night Live during the 1992 election, bumped his favorability ratings. Additionally, George W.
Bush may have benefited from political humor during his 2000 presidential race, because unlike
Al Gore, Bush was perceived to have better embraced humorists’ impersonations (Pfau et al.;
2001). Furthermore, Brewer and Cao (2006) found significant results from audience exposure to
the 2004 presidential candidates on late-night comedy shows. Viewers of these programs showed
increases in knowledge of both facts about the candidates and information on the race.
Humor as a Gateway
Does political humor inspire interest in politics? Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert
downplay their popular programs as “fake news,” but in reality many people report soft-news
programs, specifically The Daily Show and The Colbert Report, as a source for political
information. For some, soft-news is the only source of information, but for others it sparks an
interest in politics and leads to an increase in news consumptions. While investigating the
19

learning effects of comedy programs like The Daily Show, Xenos and Becker (2009) suggested
that humor facilitates learning by acting as a gateway. The comedy of Jon Stewart and Stephen
Colbert requires some prior acquaintance with their topics. Otherwise their impact on viewers
would be minimal (Xenos, & Becker, 2009). In addition, humor is a social emotion. People like
to laugh together. Comedy thus produces a water-cooler effect. In an effort to participate,
viewers seek out other sources so they might get the joke.
Using an experimental design, Xenos and Becker (2009) tested whether The Daily Show
would cause viewers to supplement their political knowledge from the show. By giving
participants the opportunity to surf the Web after viewing the clips, they were able to track the
browsing history of the participants. They found those who watched the Stewart clip were more
likely to search for articles relating to the topic. They concluded shows like The Daily Show act
as supplements rather than replacements for traditional media. In another study, Young and
Tisinger (2006) find The Daily Show and other humorous news-type programs have become
direct replacements for traditional news. These results suggest political comedy is part of a more
complex learning process, “despite self-reports of learning from such programs among young
viewers” (Xenos, & Becker, p. 319).
Social Networks
Understanding social networks is another important piece to the puzzle. Social networks
influence the flow of political information (Huckfeldt, & Sprague, 1987). Saying “politics is a
social activity imbedded within structured patterns of social interaction,” Huckfeldt and Sprague
(1987) were among the first to tap into the effects of information sharing about politics among
members of social networks (p. 1197). Their study looked at the effects of dissonant information
among supporters of the minority party in a given social network, in this case South Bend,
20

Indiana. They found supporters of the minority party were affected by dissent messages whereas
supporters of the majority party were not.
An important piece to their research was the notion that although one can choose their
friends, this is bounded by his or her location. Furthermore, Downs (1957) argues it is rational
for individuals to reduce the cost of obtaining political information by seeking information from
personal contacts. Therefore, individuals seek out those, who align with their preferences. When
there is an asymmetrical distribution of partisanship, individuals supporting the minority party
have fewer options when it comes to using others as a shortcut for political information.
Although this makes intuitive sense, the advancement of online communication technologies,
and the high frequency of online behavior using social networking sites, loosens the bounds of
location. In other words, one’s social network is no longer bound by a physical location. Indeed,
Nie et al., found the Internet saturates political taste by offering news coverage across the
political spectrum. Therefore, the reach of political information flows likewise increases, and
people potentially have more options when it comes to picking their social network. This creates
a capacity for the reach of political information to increase when it is shared online. Knowledge
of what people chose to share is more and more important.
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Chapter II: Research Design
Each morning people wake up check their e-mail, maybe their facebook, grab a cup of
coffee and head out the door, smart phone in hand. With the Internet at their fingertips the age of
print journalism is all but extinct. As the graphs in figure one indicate, the way people today
consume information differs greatly from how subsequent generations got their news. News
consumption is primarily digital. Furthermore, the lifespan of any given story is largely
determined not only by how many media outlets broadcast it, but also how many consumers pass
it along via e-mail, facebook, YouTube, or even twitter. Empirical tests of what people share are
scant at best. Fowler, et al. (2009) recognizes the potential for new areas of social science
research, but claims current studies of this kind are run in private industries like Google, Yahoo,
and the National Security Agency rather than by researchers in higher institutions. One of the
hurdles to such research is privacy laws. Current laws protect much of the digital imprints
consumers leave behind when they surf the Web, access their social media pages, or check their
e-mail. An experiment gets around this hurdle. A researcher does not need to sift through pages
of private information when participants volunteer to watch a short clip relaying political
information and are given the option of sharing the clip via social media, i.e. facebook, twitter,
YouTube, Digg, or e-mail. Their behavior can be recorded and analyzed to answer the same
question, of what causes someone to share a political issue. This paper suggests humor plays a
significant role in determining the sharing potential of political information.
A major drawback of current research of humor effects has been the lack of rigorous
control. With so many moving parts, isolating what contributes and what detracts from learning
and humor are difficult to isolate. Therefore it is not surprising results have been mixed. What
can be agreed upon is the public lacks interest in politics (Baum, 2002; Converse, 1990; Delli
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Caprini, 2000). Scholars are split on the level of contribution humor brings to political
information dissemination. Yet they agree political humor appears to help individuals learn about
and become interested in politics at some level. Refinement of research hopefully will add to a
better understanding of humor in politics.
Despite those who claim humor adds to cynicism, I hypothesize people are actually good
at identifying slant, and humor plays an important role in increasing levels of participation.
Whether it is through the retelling of a joke, or a desire to “get the joke”, people are probably
more likely to share information, “tune-in” and therefore participate in the democratic process
when messages are received in a humorous or entertaining way. In the era of mass information
and multi-tasking, people tend to filter information. Therefore capturing the attention of the
public requires more than simply putting information out there; it also requires that the
information capture a public's interest. Could shows like The Daily Show and The Colbert Report
be viewed as news consumption and positively affect political interest and information sharing?
If so, how will this change how we view political humorists?
In an effort to hone in on these relationships, I designed an experiment. In this study,
participants were assigned to one of three conditions. The experiment included a survey to gauge
participants’ media habits, level of political involvement, degree of cynicism regarding the
government and media, level of political knowledge, and basic demographic information. This
experimental design improves on past research by attempting to gain greater control. One
condition featured a 2-minute 45-second segment on the Greek financial crisis, delivered by
Stephen Colbert in his usual humorous and satirical manner. The second condition keeps
Colbert’s script, but is read by a local broadcaster. The visuals from the original skit were
maintained. These clips, which features exerts from MSNBC, CNN, ABC and Fox News, was
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maintained minus Colbert’s humor in the third condition. A news broadcaster from a local radio
program provided the transitions between these exerts. His script was designed in keeping with
Colbert’s verbiage, minus the jokes. Careful attention was taken to not add extraneous
information or remove any pertinent information. Images for the second condition included as
many of the same elements as the Colbert clip. Therefore instead of trying to find a news clip,
which contained the same information and visuals as the Colbert video, one was created. This
improves on past projects because variations between clips could be minimized, allowing the
relationship between humor and sharing to be better observed.
In each condition, after viewing the video, participants were given the option to share it.
Although, no information was actually shared, participants were led to believe they were sharing
the video online. For conditions two and three, approximately 36% shared their videos. In the
Colbert condition closer to 48% shared the video. In addition to the stimulus, participants
answered post questions regarding how laughable, humorous, amusing, entertaining, informative
and interesting they found the video. Furthermore, a short quiz was given on the content of the
videos to ascertain the amount of information participants absorbed from watching the video.
Finally, they were asked if they would seek additional information on the topic, and where they
would seek it.
The Greek financial crisis was chosen in an attempt to minimize partisanship. As can be
seen by the graph in figure 2, partisanship does not seem to correlate with the mean thermometer
reading of Colbert or Stewart nor the mean thermometer reading of journalists Diane Sawyer or
Wolf Blitzer, both of whom appear in all three videos. This suggests a universal and unpartisan
quality to the findings of this experiment. The clip shown was limited to 2-minutes and 45seconds in keeping with the average length of a news segment. Furthermore, in keeping with
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research about the exceptionally low interest in international events among the American public,
an international issue seemed particularly well suited for observing movement in interest.
Domestic issues might already rank high in interest among some respondents, as might their
level of knowledge pertaining to the issue. This is less likely to occur when the issue is the Greek
financial crisis.
This design combines both experimental and survey methods. Survey data alone presents
problems because of difficulties in isolating causation. The experimental method tries to tease
out causation (Campbell, & Stanley, 1963). Participants in the study were a convenient sample of
164 university students in primarily general education classes. A small amount of extra credit
was offered for their participation. Although Sears (1986) argued college students are not
representative of the population at large, the National Annenberg Election Survey (2004) found
The Colbert Report and The Daily Show’s key demographics are college-aged individuals.
Entertainment media in general have a growing audience among the youth (Hollander, 2005;
Young, 2004). Furthermore, the differences between college students and the general population
have been well documented. Therefore, using college students as subjects for this type of study
will not detract from the results. One possible exception is subjects will likely to watch political
humor in a very different way than a laboratory setting. However, with media universally
available replications of like conditions are impossible.
Findings
As expected social media are the most used medium. Participants in this experiment
reported using social media nearly five days per week. Furthermore around 50% said they
accessed social media everyday. In contrast, the mean reported time spent reading a newspaper
was only one day per week, with nearly 60% saying they never read print news. Online news
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received the highest mean (3.3 days) for news readership with 20% saying they access news
online everyday. Even still 20% reported never reading news online. More people reported
watching local news, between 2-3 days per week, than national news, slightly less than 2 days
per week. In this experiment 100% of respondents reported having a personal e-mail account;
92.68% said they had a facebook profile; 70.73% said they had a YouTube account; 40.85% said
they had a twitter account; 23.17% said they had a personal blog or Live Journal, and 4.27% said
they had a Digg account. Such high numbers indicate people are traversing, sharing, and
communicating online, nearly everyday.
When it comes to news personalities, including “fake” ones, Stephen Colbert was the
most liked among both Democrats and Republicans, Jon Stewart was liked second best, with the
exception of Independents where the relationship was flipped. Wolf Blitzer garnered the lowest
favorability rating, followed by Diane Sawyer. Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert were the most
known with only 40 and 41 respondents answering “Don’t Know.” On the other hand, 96 of the
164 people said they did not know Wolf Blitzer, and 53 said they did not know Diane Sawyer.
While this study may not be the Nielsen ratings, these findings suggest researchers should take a
serious look at the funny people delivering fake news. Stephen Colbert and Jon Stewart are the
most recognizable and favorable personalities.
Humor, Sharing, and Information Sharing
The analysis that follows considers the pattern of information flows when humor is
involved, specifically in regards to new media and information sharing. I am specifically testing
the following questions: (1) are people likely to share political information using social media;
(2) if yes, under what conditions is sharing most likely to occur? Using a logit model, the
relationship between sharing and the three conditions was tested. Running logistic regressions
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are appropriate for this type of analysis because the dependent variable is binary. Either the
person shared, or they did not. Also, the independent variables are either categorical, in the case
of the humor measure, or else also binary as is the case with the conditions. Of the three
conditions, the Colbert condition had the only significant relationship with sharing. For those in
the Colbert condition, the coefficient for sharing was .664. Neither the second Colbert imitated
condition nor the news condition had a significant relationship with sharing. Nevertheless, the
nearly 40% of all respondents chose to share their video. The second Colbert imitation condition
did not register as significant. A test revealed respondents did not rank it as being very
humorous. One thought is that humor is something not easily replicable. Therefore it is erroneous
to assume humor is careless. Rather care and thought go into crafting and executing humorous
material despite its seemly slapdash nature. The results of the second condition were then
lumped in with the news condition to be as conservative as possible in the testing of the Colbert
conditions effect on sharing.
The Colbert imitation condition was created out of concern that instead of measuring
humor, a Colbert specific effect would be measured. Anticipating humor would be difficult to
recreate, post measures were created to tease out a humor measure. The humor variable was
created after correlating answers to questions of how humorous, amusing, laughable, and
entertaining respondents found the video. All variables were correlated at the minimum .80.
They were added and divided by four after the variables were rescaled from 1-7 to 0-6 and
divided by 6 to create a 0-1 scale. This new variable was put in the logistic regression to get the
mediating effects of humor on the Colbert Condition. What was found as indicated by table 1, is
humor drives sharing. When mediated for humor, the Colbert condition’s significance
disappeared and its coefficient sign flipped. On the other hand, the humor variable produced a
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coefficient score of 2.51 and a P value of .000. Therefore, we can be fairly certain humor
influences how shareable people find a video notwithstanding concerns regarding Colbert’s
celebrity and its effect on sharing. Essentially, despite Colbert’s likeability, if he fails to deliver
humor, people will not share his video. The predicted probability of humor, as can be seen in
table 2, is 68.98% when humor is ranked at its highest verses 15.31% when humor is ranked at
zero. The Colbert condition was held at one.
These findings fit with Zillmann (1980, 1983), who argued the degree audience members
engage and react to humor depends on whether their expectations have been met. Zillmann’s
theory as applied to comedy is that maximum enjoyment of political comedy will be achieved
when audience members’ expectations interact with the material being presented. In other words,
if they are tuning in to watch The Daily Show or the Colbert Report, expecting political satire,
they will be satisfied fully only to the extent Jon Stewart and Stephan Colbert deliver on this
expectation. Keeping with Zillmann, Holbert (2005) advocates that scholars of political
communication need to “recognize whether audience members are expecting and, as a result,
actively seeking out entertainment television content that is inherently political or is grounded in
the presentation of political processes” (p.443). His research indicates one should expect
differences when viewers seek out political humor from when politics is couched with otherwise
apolitical entertainment programming. Therefore, people are satisfied when Colbert and Stewart
are funny. How funny viewers find them determines whether viewers will want to share the
information with others.
A desire to seek more information also appears to meditate sharing in the Colbert
condition. If one wants to share the information, chances are that person will also want to seek
more information on the topic. The Colbert condition again falls from significances, but the
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coefficient does not flip. Given the information in table 1, a person is more likely to seek more
information if they have shared the video. However, when desire to seek more information is the
dependent variable, the story changes. Instead of emotion driving information seeking, Colbert
seems to affect the probability of seeking more information. In the second part of the study the
analysis that follows seeks to understand the pattern of information seeking, specifically in
regards to interest and the Colbert personality. I am testing the following questions: (1) How
much does interest influence the likelihood people will report a desire to seek more information;
(2) what if any effect does Colbert appear to have over this reported desire to learn more?
Xenos and Becker (2009) found a significant relationship between viewers of a Jon
Stewart clip and information seeking behavior. However, it does not appear that humor drives
this behavior. Mediation effects with humor were insignificant. As table 3 indicates interest
influences desire to seek information, but interest did not mediate Colbert. These findings
suggest Downs’ (1957) argument that individuals filter information by seeking sources with high
credibility. Colbert appears to be functioning as a heuristic for what information deserves
attention.
One of the problems is the more information variable. On might expect people answered
yes because it was a survey, without tracking the behavior, one cannot be certain they actually
did seek more information. Nevertheless the pattern fits with previous findings. Furthermore to
be conservative in the measure, those who answered unsure were coded to fit in the middle of a
three-point scale ranging from 0-1, with .5 as the middle value. Again a logit model was used.
What was found is a pattern where, only 23% of those in the Colbert condition indicated they
would not seek more information. Furthermore, when running a simple regression with interest
as the dependent variable and Colbert as the independent variable, no significant relationship was
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found. Thus, Colbert does not seem to be the determinate of interest. However, the combination
of high interest in the video and Colbert resulted in an 87% predicted probability of seeking more
information.
Conclusion
Only of late, researchers have attempted to analyze and interpret the ramifications of
humor in media. Those in the political humor industry, continue to stress they are not in the news
business. However, large numbers of viewers actively tune in to political comedy programming.
This, compounded with the unique effects of humor on sharing, warrants further scholarly
inquiry to both gauge the impact of humor on political interest and better define the political
humorists role in the news industry. Recent projects in this area have so far found mixed results
in regards to learning, but no one has yet to test its effects on information sharing (Baumgartner
& Mirris, 2006; Brewer and Cao, 2006; Hollander, 2005; Kim &Vishak, 2008; Xenos, & Becker,
2009; Young, & Tisinger, 2006).
People today learn about their world in different ways from subsequent generations (Nie
et al.; 2010). Social media have become a part of many people’s daily lives. They check
facebook, read blogs, tweet their comings and goings, essentially broadcasting their preferences,
activities, and lives to their family, friends, colleagues, acquaintances, and even strangers. A
social network is no longer confined by geography. Furthermore, the value of privacy seems to
be waning. One can only speculate as to the reasons, but the implications for political science
research are boundless. Finding new ways to measure these digital imprints will advance the
study of political opinion and behavior. As far as this study is concerned, humor seems to
differentiate from serious material. It contains a quality, which causes people to want to pass it
along. Furthermore, humor appears to transcend partisanship.
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Nevertheless, when it comes to indicating a desire to seek more information, the picture
is less clear. Although, this experiment’s findings support Xenos and Becker (2009), it is unclear
whether interest is truly the mediating variable. To some extent it appears as though Colbert,
himself, accounts for some of the desire to seek more information. This supports Downs (1957)
claim that people seek information from people they view as credible. Thus, the good news of
humor driving sharing is tempered in light of the fact Colbert rather than humor or interest
influences whether people will expend the energy to seek supplemental information. While it is
the job of journalists to act as gatekeepers of information, Colbert and Stewart have explicitly
stated they are not journalists, politicians, or otherwise political elites. Yet as more research
centers on their effect on political behavior, this claim holds less weight. It is important to note
that political humorists are not held to journalistic standards while at the same time they fill a
journalists role of cueing people as to what political issues are important and warrant further
investigation. Should those rules apply to political humorists, or are they filling a role not suited
to the traditional structure?
Despite arguments over the quality and quantity to which political entertainment
mitigates the political engagement deficit among the American electorate, political humor seems
to peak interest and influence sharing. Although, comedy has influenced politics since at least the
time of Ancient Greece, scholars are treating political humor as a newly emerged phenomenon in
the learning process of politics. This explains why little empirical research has been done on
humor in politics. The study of humor in politics requires refinement. This experiment attempted
to address some common problems when trying to study the information sharing and interest
effects of humor. What it found is if politics is a bad tasting medicine, humor might the sugar,
which helps it go down
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Appendix I

N= 164

Figure 1.Graphs of Reported Per-Weekly News Consumption by Medium

40

* Number of Respondents Wolf Biltzer = 68 * Number of Respondents Diane Sawyer = 111 * Number of Respondents Jon Stewart = 124 *
Number of Respondents Stephen Colbert = 123* Missing Respondents Answered Don’t Know

Figure 2. Mean Thermometer Rating of Wolf Blitzer, Diane Sawyer, Jon Stewart, and Stephan
Colbert
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Table 1
Logistic Regression: Effect of Colbert Condition on Sharing via Social Media
Independent
Variables

Coef.

Coef.
w/mediation

Coef.
w/mediation

Constant

-0.735
(-3.58)
0.664*
(1.97)
—

-1.54
(-5.06)
-.0168
(-.40)
2.51**
(3.94)
—

-1.32
(-4.46)
0.474
(1.35)
—

Colbert
Humor
Seek More
Information

—

1.19**
(3.07)

**P < .01 * P < .05 Note: Logistic regression z scores in (parenthesis) Colbert condition P values dropped from significance in mediated
iterations Sobel test for mediation effects on humor mediation: t= 3.46; Std. error = .248 P value = 0.001 Sobel test for mediation effects on seek
more information mediation: t= 2.12; Std. error = .609 P value = 0.034 N= 164
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Table 2
Predicted Probabilities of Sharing
Independent
Variables

Prvalue
Sharing = 1
(Shared)

95%
Confidence
Interval

Prvalue
Sharing = 0
(Did Not Share)

95%
Confidence
Interval

Colbert = 0

.3241

(.2358, .4123)

.6759

(.5877, .7642)

Colbert = 1

.4821

(.3513, .6130)

.5179

(.3870, 0.6487)

Humor = 0
(Colbert=1)

.1531

(.0223, .2838)

.8469

(.7162, .9777)

Humor = 1
(Colbert=1)

.6898

(.5420, .8375)

.3102

(.1625, .4580)

Seek More
Information = 0
(Colbert=1)
Seek More
Information = 1
(Colbert=1)

.3023

(.1455, .4554)

.6977

(.5446, .8545)

.5851

(.4402, .7299)

.4149

(.2701, .5598)
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Table 3
Logistic Regression: Effect of Colbert Condition on Information Seeking
Independent
Variables

Coef.

Coef.
w/mediation

Constant

.111
(.58)
1.09**
(2.93)
—

-.836**
(-2.39)
1.04**
(2.72)
1.71**
(3.28)

Colbert
Interest

** P < .01 Logistic regression z scores in (parenthesis) Sobel test for mediation effects on interest mediation: t= 1.137; Std. error = .0997 P
value = 0.2557 N= 164
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Table 4
Predicted Probabilities of Information Seeking
Independent
Variables

Prvalue
More Info = 1
(Seek More
Information)

95%
Confidence
Interval

Prvalue
More Info = 0
(Does Not Seek
More
Information)

95%
Confidence
Interval

Colbert = 0

.5278

(.4336, .6219)

.4722

(.3781, .5664)

Colbert = 1

.7679

(.6573, .8784)

.2321

(.1216, .3427)

Interest = 0
(Colbert=1)

.5511

(.3424, .7598)

.4489

(.2402, .6576)

Interest = 1
(Colbert=1)

.8713

(.7824, .9603)

.1287

(.0397, .2176)
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Appendix II
Condition 1 Script

THE EUROPIAN UNION OR E-U HAS BEEN LOARDING THEIR PRECIOUS EURO
OVER OUR DOLLAR JUST BECAUSE IT STILL HAS VALUE.
WELL IM HAPPY TO SAY EUROPE’S PRECIOUS ECONOMY IS NOW SHRINKING SO
FAST THAT IT WILL SOON FIT IN TO THEIR TINY MEN’S PANTS.
…LOOKS LIKE THOSE ARE ALREADY WELL STUFFED.
THE EUROPEANS BROUGHT THIS ON THEMSELVES BY ASSOCIATING WITH
PIGS…AND BY PIGS I DON’T MEAN THE ANIMALS WHO’S INTESTANS THEY
NORMALLY PACK WITH CHEESE.
JIM…
YES PIGS IS AN ACRONYM.
AND A PERFECT ACRONYM FOR EUROPE.
BECAUSE IT MAKES BOTH JEWS AND MUSLIMS FEEL UNWELCOME.
BUT ONE LITTLE PIGGY IS WALLOWING DEEPER THAN THE REST.
A MODERN GREEK DRAMA.
WHICH MEANS NOT ONLY THAT THE COUNTRY’S ECONOMY IS FAILING.
IT MEANS THE COUNTRY IS PROBABLY BANGING IT’S MOTHER.
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NOW FOLKS THIS IS NO SURPRISE.
GREECE IS A MESS.
EVEN THEIR MOST VALUABLE REAL ESTATE LOOKS WORSE THAN DETROIT.
AND NOW GREECE HAS GONE CRAWLING TO IT’S WEALTHIEST EURO ZONE
PARTNER GERMANY FOR A BAILOUT.
BUT GERMANY HAS REFUSED.
IM SORRY GREECE BUT GERMANY IS FEELING JUST A LITTLE BIT BURNED AFTER
YOU DIDN’T APPRECIATE THEIR LAST GIFT, FREE NAZI TROOPS.
SO THE GREEKS HAS BEEN FORCED TO MAKE BUDGET CUTBACKS, OR IN GREEK
BUTTCRACKS.
BUT THESE AUSTERITY MEASURES HAVE LED TO VIOLENCE IN THE STREETS
AND IN THEIR RESAURANTS.
BUT IS THE MEDIA BLAMING THE COUNTRY THAT BLOWS HALF ITS GDP ON
REPLACEMENT CROCKERY?
NO, THEY’RE POINTED THEIR FINGERS AT BENEVOLENT KELPTOGARKY
GOLDMAN SACHS.
JUST BECAUSE IN 2001 GOLDMAN HELPED HIDE BILLIONS IN GREEK DEBT WHICH
WAS KEY IN QUOTE “GREECE JOINING THE EURO.”
WHICH REPLACED THEIR OLD CURRENCY THE GYRO.
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Condition 2 Script

FOR MANY YEARS PAST THE EUROPEAN UNION… OR E-U… HAS HAD A
CURRENCY VALUE OF SOMETIMES DOUBLE THAT AGAINST THE AMERICAN
DOLLAR.
THE E.U. USED TO PRIZE THEIR CURRENCY OVER THE DOLLAR BECAUSE IT “HAS
VALUE“…BUT NOW, THE CONTINENT’S CURRENCY… THE EURO… HAS FALLEN
TO JUST OVER EQUAL VALUE TO THAT OF THE U.S. DOLLAR.
(00:20)
JUST AS RECENTLY AS 2009... THE EURO WAS FIFTY PERCENT ABOVE THE
AMERICAN DOLLAR.
AS OF THE MIDDLE OF 2010... THE EURO’S VALUE AGAINST THE AMERICAN
DOLLAR EQUALS $1.35.
ONE BIG FACTOR TO THE EXTREME COLLASPE OF THE CURRENCY IS THE
EUROPEAN UNION’S INCLUSION OF FOUR ADDITIONAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
THAT HAVE STRUGGLING ECONOMIES THAT DO NOT COMPARE WELL TO THE
TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC POWERS IN EUROPE.
(00:44)
THE COUNTRIES OF PORTUGAL, IRELAND, GREECE, AND SPAIN CULMITATE TO
THE POPULAR ACRONYM “P.IG.S.”
THE FOUR COUNTRIES THAT ARE OFTEN POPULAR TOURIST DESTINATIONS
HAVE STRUGGLED DOMESTICALLY IN PROVIDING ECONOMIC GROWTH.
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(00:54)
THE NATION OF GREECE IN PARTICULAR HAS FALLEN MORE THAN $400 BILLION
IN DEBT.
THE COUNTRY HAS SEEN MULTIPLE PUBLIC PROTESTS INCLUDING RIOTS IN
EXTREME CASES OF PUBLIC OUTRAGE THAT POURED OUT INTO THE STREETS
LEADING TO FOUR CIVILIAN DEATHS.
THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC UNREST IS LEADING TO A MODERN DAY GREEK
DRAMA.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE GREEK ECONOMY BEGAN WHEN THE COUNTRY
CONVERTED ITS MONETARY SYSTEM TO THE EURO.
THE EURO WAS INTENDED TO BLANKET THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHO
COULD FINANCIALLY SUBSTAIN THEMSELVES.
BUT THE THEN STRUGGLING GREEK ECONOMY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO BOUNCE
BACK.
THE NATION OF GREECE IS KNOWN FOR SOME OF THE EARLIEST TRACES OF
MODERN DAY CIVILIZATION AND NOW IT IS CRUMBLING DOWN LIKE THE
COUNTRIES HISTORIC ARCHITECTURE.
(01:47)
GREECE HAS ASKED THE EUROPEAN UNION FOR A BAILOUT BUT THE ECONOMIC
STRONG COUNTRY OF GERMANY HAS REMAINED CAUTIOUS TO THE SIGNING OF
A $110 BILLION BAILOUT PACKAGE.
GERMANY HAS REMAINED SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE PACKAGE AS GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS IN THE COUNTRY BELIEVE THE SIGNING OF THE PACKAGE MIGHT
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NOT BE SUCCESSFUL IN SAVING THE DEBT CONSUMING GREECE.
(02:06)
FOR THE TIME BEING… THE GREECE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE CUTBACKS IN
MULTIPLE SECTORS OF THE COUNTRY’S ECONOMY.
THE CITIZENS HAVE CONTINUED TO VOICE THEIR FRUSTRATIONS WITH
PROTESTS AND ACTION IN THE STREETS.
THIS TAKING PLACE IN A COUNTRY THAT HAS BEEN KNOWN AS A
LIGHTHEARTED DESTINATION FOR TOURISTS.
(02:26)
ALTHOUGH MANY OUTSIDE MEDIA SOURCES BLAME THE COUNTRY’S
DOWNFALL TO DOMESTIC FAILURES IN GREECE ITSELF…
OTHER MEDIA HAVE POINTED THE BLAME TO KEY RESEARCH AND PROPOSALS
PLACED BY THE U.S. BASED CORPORATION “GOLDMAN SACHS.”
THEY CLAIM THE GLOBAL INVESTMENT AND BANKING FIRM LIED ON KEY
FINANCIAL RECORDS THAT ENABLED GREECE TO PASS INSPECTION TO
CONVERT TO THE EURO.
(02:45)
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